BudgetOverrun.com is an independent reference site. Not affiliated with any PM software vendor. Statistics sourced from published research and cited throughout.

Defense Project Budget Overruns: GAO Acquisitions Data

The US Government Accountability Office produces the most detailed open dataset on defense programme cost growth. Cumulative cost growth across the major programmes is 45% above baseline.

+45%
cumulative cost growth across the MDAP portfolio
$628B
total cost increase above original baselines
102
major defense acquisition programmes tracked (FY24)
2 years
average schedule slip across MDAPs

Headline overrun examples from GAO assessments

ProgrammeServiceCost growth vs originalSource year
F-35 Joint Strike FighterJoint+82%GAO-24
Sentinel ICBM (formerly GBSD)USAF+81%GAO-24, Nunn-McCurdy breach
Columbia-class submarineUSN+12%GAO-23
Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN-78)USN+23%GAO-22
Littoral Combat ShipUSN+108%GAO-15
KC-46A Pegasus tankerUSAF+33%GAO-23
V-22 OspreyUSMC+186%GAO historical

Cost growth measured against original acquisition baselines, in then-year dollars from GAO Annual Assessments of Weapon Programmes.


Why defense programmes overrun

  • Concurrency: Building production units while design and testing are ongoing. The F-35 is the canonical example of concurrency-driven rework.
  • Requirements churn: 10-15 year programmes survive multiple administrations, doctrines, and threat assessments. The requirements baseline shifts.
  • Optimism bias in original estimates: Programme advocates have an incentive to under-estimate to secure approval. This is the strategic-misrepresentation pattern Flyvbjerg identified for civilian megaprojects.
  • Sole-source supply chain: Specialist subsystems often have one or two qualified suppliers. Cost competition is structurally limited.
  • Nunn-McCurdy thresholds: US law requires re-certification at 15% / 25% cost growth. Programmes near these thresholds have an incentive to re-baseline rather than admit overrun, which then resets the clock.

Sources and how to cite

US Government Accountability Office (2024). Weapon Systems Annual Assessment. GAO-24-106831.

Source URLs:

Related references

Updated 2026-05-11